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ABSTRACT
This article examines irregular South-South migration from China to Ghana, and the role it
played in transforming livelihoods and broader developmental landscapes. It looks at the
entry of approximately 50,000 Chinese migrants into the informal small-scale gold mining
sector from 2008-2013. These migrants mainly hailed from Shanglin County in Guangxi
Province. In Ghana, they formed mutually beneﬁcial relationships with local miners, both
legal and illegal, introducing machinery that substantially increased gold production. How-
ever, the legal status of Chinese miners was particularly problematic as, by law, small-
scale mining is restricted to Ghanaian citizens. In mid-2013, President Mahama established
a military task force against illegal mining, resulting in the deportation of many Chinese
miners. The article examines the experiences of both Chinese migrants and Ghanaian min-
ers. Findings are that irregular migration into an informal sector had long-lasting impacts
and played a signiﬁcant role in the transformation of economic, political, and physical
landscapes in Ghana.
INTRODUCTION
From the mid-2000–2013, approximately 50,000 irregular Chinese migrants entered Ghana to
engage in small-scale gold mining. These migrants overwhelmingly hailed from Shanglin County,
in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region — an area with a tradition of alluvial gold mining, and
also a nationally designated “poverty-stricken county” (pinkun xian) that is home to the Zhuang
ethnic minority group. Upon arrival in Ghana, the Chinese miners introduced new machinery and
technology that dramatically increased the production of gold, although at the cost of serious envi-
ronmental degradation.
The arrival of the Chinese miners was controversial, not least for reasons related to their legal
status. According to the Minerals and Mining Act 2006 (Act 703, Section 83a), artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM) is reserved for Ghanaian citizens (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, 2006).
Thus, it is illegal for any foreign nationals to engage in small-scale mining operations. Until
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recently, Ghanaian miners could apply for a 25-acre land concession and a license from the Miner-
als Commission allowing them to mine.1 However, the large majority of small-scale mining under-
taken by Ghanaians is unregistered, and therefore unlawful.2
Such illicit mining is known colloquially as galamsey. In Ghana, Chinese migrant miners
found ways to integrate themselves into the widespread illicit gold mining sector (Teschner,
2012; Hilson et al., 2014; Crawford and Botchwey, 2017). Many of the Chinese miners formed
mutually beneﬁcial relationships with local people and their activities also stimulated local mar-
kets. However, their presence also caused conﬂict in places, notably where disputes occurred
between local artisanal miners and Chinese miners over access to mining sites, at times turned
over to Chinese miners by locals, with the connivance of chiefs and other public ofﬁcials. In
particular, the Chinese miners have been accused of displacing and outcompeting local alluvial
gold miners, feeding into widespread corruption and stealing Ghanaian mineral resources
through gold smuggling (Abid et al., 2013). For a number of years, it seemed as though the
government was simply ignoring the phenomenon. However, in May 2013, media pressure
eventually pushed former President Mahama into establishing a military-style task force against
illegal mining. This resulted in the arrest of many foreign miners, with over 4500 Chinese
nationals either deported or leaving “voluntarily” (Modern Ghana 12 July 2013; Kaiman and
Hirsch, 2013).
In the wake of the 2013 military task force, the numbers of Chinese miners in the country
reduced considerably, although some still remain, or come and go, as discussed below. How-
ever, the consequences of this intense (and ongoing) episode have been signiﬁcant and transfor-
mative. The mechanization and intensiﬁcation of Ghana’s small-scale alluvial mining sector —
mainly due to the new technologies introduced by the Chinese miners and adopted by Ghana-
ian miners — has irreversibly changed the traditional way that alluvial mining was undertaken
in the country, and in many instances it can no longer be described as artisanal. Intensiﬁed
mining has also resulted in widespread environmental destruction of land and waterbodies.
These signiﬁcant changes, largely due to Chinese involvement, have led to the controversial
ban by President Akufo-Addo’s government on all small-scale mining, both legal and illegal,
with effect from early April 2017 to date, citing the problem of environmental degradation.3 .
The ban has been enforced by a second military task force, Operation Vanguard, launched on
31 July 2017 with 400 military and police ofﬁcers in the main areas of alluvial ASM in south-
ern Ghana.4
Irregular South-South migration into informal labour sectors has received relatively little system-
atic research attention. This article examines the phenomenon of irregular migration by Chinese
miners into Ghana’s informal alluvial mining sector. It addresses the following question:
What impact does mass migration of this kind have on the livelihoods of informal miners (both
Chinese and Ghanaian), as well as on wider economic, environmental and political landscapes in
Ghana?
The article is divided into ﬁve sections. The next section provides a brief review of key literature
on Chinese migration to Africa. The third section focuses on this recent example of irregular migra-
tion of Chinese miners to Ghana to undertake small-scale gold mining. The fourth section explores
the outcomes of this migration event for both Chinese and Ghanaian miners, as well as the wider
consequences in Ghana. Finally, the conclusion argues that the impact and effects of this irregular
migration have been signiﬁcant and long lasting — not only for the actors involved, but also for
the ASM sector, the physical landscape in mining areas, as well as Ghanaian society and polity
more broadly. Policy implications are outlined, including the recognition and regulation of foreign
involvement in small-scale mining and an update of Ghana’s immigration policy to reﬂect the new
situation.
The paper is based on ﬁeldwork undertaken in both Ghana and China. In Ghana, a total of 39
semi-structured interviews were conducted from April 2014 to January 2015 in Accra and around
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Dunkwa-on-Ofﬁn, the municipal capital of the Upper Denkyira East Municipality in the Central
Region of Ghana, where there was a sizable number of Chinese miners before the 2013 task force.
At the national level in Accra, representatives from relevant government agencies were interviewed,
including the Minister and Chief Director of the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources; the dep-
uty director of the Environmental Protection Agency; the chairman of the Parliamentary Select
Committee on Mines and Energy; senior ofﬁcials in the Minerals Commission, the Ghana Immigra-
tion Service, and the Precious Minerals Marketing Company; and the national administrator of the
Association of Small-Scale Miners. In addition, representatives from the Chinese business commu-
nity were interviewed, including some with direct links to small-scale mining. In Upper Denkyira
East Municipality, interviews were held with government ofﬁcials, local politicians and chiefs, as
well as with local journalists and Ghanaian small-scale miners. Focus group discussions were held
in two mining communities. In addition, visits were undertaken to mining sites, both legal and ille-
gal, to observe mining processes at ﬁrst hand, including the degree of environmental degradation.
In China, ﬁeldwork was undertaken in mid-2017 and mid-2018 in the Shanglin County seat area,
including in the two townships from which the vast majority of the miners originate.
In total, 43 semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with returned miners and
their families, non-returned miner households, non-mining households, local ofﬁcials at the village,
township and county levels, mining-related businesses, staff in the county hospital and a local jour-
nalist who has reported extensively on the Chinese miners in Ghana. Fieldwork in China was based
on the Systematic and Reﬂexive Interviewing and Reporting (SRIR) method, with interviews being
conducted by small teams of two to three researchers, all of whom asked questions and took notes.
Interviewing was directly followed by collaborative report writing and reﬂexive dialogue in order
to facilitate preliminary in situ analysis, uncover emerging themes and identify future interviewees
(Loubere, 2017).
Additionally, documentary data, systematic participant observation and visual data in the form of
photos were also collected. After the completion of ﬁeldwork, all the data collected and produced
were analysed in the qualitative data analysis programme Dedoose.
South-South migration from China to Africa
Chinese migration to Africa has become a signiﬁcant economic and political issue (Broadman,
2007; Brautigam, 2009; Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009; Cardenal and Araujo, 2014). However,
detailed and systematic research on the extent and nature of this mass migration — or on its devel-
opmental impact — is limited. As Chee-Beng Tan (2013: 6) notes in the Routledge Handbook of
the Chinese Diaspora: “There have been rather few academic studies on the Chinese in Africa”.
Indeed, the data on the number of Chinese migrants in Africa remain speculative and estimates
vary considerably. While there is consensus that the Chinese population in Africa has “increased
rapidly in recent years” (Li, 2013: 62–64), there is still signiﬁcant “paucity” of data on Chinese
migrant ﬂows to Africa, particularly with regard to the types and numbers of migrants (Mohan and
Tan-Mullins, 2009: 591).
As part and parcel of the wider globalization phenomenon, China’s sudden “scramble for Africa”
does not follow a neat coherent narrative that lends itself to generalisations or “summing up”
(Alden et al., 2008), although the quest for natural resources is clearly a key driver of China’s
increased engagement with Africa (Alden and Alves, 2015: 248). While there exists a powerful glo-
bal narrative framing the Chinese push into Africa as a concerted one, in reality there is often little
coordination or connection between Chinese migrant populations in different African nations and
there are a wide variety of local responses to Chinese migration across the continent (Esteban,
2010; Lu, 2017). Indeed, the few existing detailed investigations into Chinese migration to Africa
point to the diversity that exists within and between Chinese migrant communities in African
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countries (French, 2014). Researchers illustrate that “new immigrants” comprise “all kinds of peo-
ple” (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009: 591). Chinese communities in Africa include ofﬁcial migrants
connected to Chinese state-related projects, e.g. in large-scale construction that is often related to
“infrastructure-for-resources loans” whereby soft loans are provided to African governments for
infrastructural projects, invariably carried out by Chinese construction companies, in return for
access to natural resources (Alden and Alves, 2015: 250). However, there are also increasingly
large numbers of independent and largely unregulated migrants, which has resulted in a “cleavage
between ofﬁcial channels and more informal ones” (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009: 589).
While it is widely acknowledged that this type of irregular migration from China to Africa has
increased substantially in recent years, it has not been well documented and remains an under-
researched ﬁeld of study (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009: 558). Nevertheless, the fact that the increas-
ing presence of Chinese migrants in informal sectors in African countries has, in some cases, cre-
ated employment for low-skilled African workers, research has shown that the growing number of
Chinese nationals in Africa has, in some instances, led to growing resentment and opposition (Aja-
kaiye and Kaplinsky, 2009; Abid et al., 2013; Wang and Elliot, 2014; Tschakert, 2016).
In the speciﬁc case of Chinese migration to Ghana, historical records from the late 19th century
indicate that the British colonial government brought indentured Chinese labourers to the former
Gold Coast (now Ghana), including a small group of 16 Chinese miners and technicians brought to
work in the gold mines in 1897 (Li, 2012: 74–75). After independence in 1957, a relatively small
Chinese business community established itself in Ghana, mainly investing and working in the cater-
ing and casino industries, as well as in small-scale agriculture (Cook et al., 2016). In the twenty-
ﬁrst century, the number of Chinese non-resident migrant workers in Ghana has increased, particu-
larly in association with large-scale government-to-government infrastructure projects, such as con-
struction of arterial roads, the Bui dam and facilities related to the oil and gas industry, with the
latter in particular ﬁnanced through an “infrastructure-for-resources loan”.5
This type of regular migration – tied to ofﬁcial construction projects – is usually short-term, and
the number of Chinese citizens entering Ghana through this route has remained relatively small.
Sautman and Yan (2007) estimated that there were approximately 6,000 Chinese migrants in Ghana
in 2004, yet numbers have increased substantially since then, primarily due to the large number of
irregular migrants. According to the Ghanaian Immigration Service, there were about 18,300 arri-
vals of Chinese citizens in 2012 and 20,300 in 2013. It is believed that many of these entrants were
related to the small-scale mining boom discussed in this paper. Additionally, such ofﬁcial ﬁgures
do not include those miners who entered Ghana illegally through porous borders, especially from
Togo where Chinese nationals have visa-on-arrival access.6 While Chinese mining companies have
no involvement in large-scale gold mining in Ghana, this paper examines the role and impact of
Chinese small-scale miners as irregular migrants in informal small-scale gold mining in Ghana.
From Shanglin County to Ghana and back again
The hike in gold prices in 2008 prompted a rush of foreign miners into Ghana, predominantly from
China. By 2013, at the height of this gold rush, Chinese news outlets estimated that around 50,000
miners had come to Ghana from China (Kane, 2013; Lu, 2017) – a ﬁgure that has been substanti-
ated in interviews with returned miners and local ofﬁcials in Shanglin County.7 . The Chinese min-
ers hail almost entirely from two townships in Shanglin County, and came to be known in Ghana
as the “Shanglin Gang”. Shanglin, whose population is primarily ethnically Zhuang (a minority
group), has a long tradition of gold mining. Throughout the 1980s, residents of Shanglin engaged
in gold mining locally and developed their own specialist alluvial mining machinery, such as trom-
mels (i.e. wash plants), crushing machines (changfa), as well as water platforms, pumps and suc-
tion equipment for river dredging for gold. In the 1990s, they migrated domestically to engage in
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small-scale mining in the northern border areas of Xinjiang and Heilongjiang, bringing their large
machines with them by train. This resulted in conﬂicts with locals in the mining areas, prompting a
governmental response that made it more difﬁcult for the miners to operate in other parts of China.
With this tightening of regulations, the Shanglin miners looked outward and began searching for
mining opportunities in other countries.8
From the mid-2000s, stories of people “striking it rich” in Ghana resulted in a steady –and then
rapid – exodus of Shanglin miners to the country, where they reportedly established over 2,000
mining operations (He, 2013).
Although there are parallels with previous historical episodes of long-distance migration from
China to North America and Australia during gold rushes from the 1850s to 1870s (Ngai, 2015),
this contemporary episode was facilitated by features of globalization, such as relatively cheap air
travel, the ability to ship large machinery around the world, and rapid, cheap telecommunications
by which information about opportunities to make money can be quickly spread by “word of
mouth” (Reilly, 2016). In this sense, the Chinese gold rush in Ghana is one manifestation of the
ongoing unprecedented migration of Chinese people from all walks of life to the African continent
pushed by broader forces of globalization to seek their fortunes in the global capitalist system (Car-
denal and Araujo, 2014). Although the increased regulation of internal migration by the Chinese
government was a factor in the Shanglin miners looking outward, our research has found no evi-
dence of any formal linkage with the Chinese government or its push for resources in Africa. On
the contrary, the migration of the Shanglin miners to Ghana and elsewhere has been a spontaneous
movement of people from a small geographical area, essentially two townships, based on their
expertise in gold mining.
Miners from Shanglin County can now be found in dozens of countries around the world, includ-
ing Russia, a number of Latin American nations, countries across Southeast Asia, as well as other
African countries. According to interviews with returned miners and their families in August 2017
and June 2018, Ghana remains the most lucrative and is still the primary destination for the Chi-
nese miners, but due to the recent moratorium large numbers have also started operations in other
African countries, particularly Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Information obtained from Shanglin County during ﬁeldwork in June 2018 indicated that miners
tend to come and go to Ghana depending on the political climate, and currently many miners have
returned to Shanglin. Nevertheless, signiﬁcant numbers still remain in Ghana despite the ongoing
government moratorium on all small-scale mining.
The contemporary China-Ghana gold rush has also been distinct from historical Chinese gold
rushes in Australia and the Americas due to the socio-economic status of the Chinese miners them-
selves. While historically Chinese miners have been in relatively subordinate positions vis-a-vis the
dominant white colonial settlers, contemporaneously in Ghana they have found themselves in a bet-
ter socio-economic situation than many of the locals, meaning that they have been able to assert
themselves in different ways and gain access to land and resources more easily than their historical
counterparts. On arrival in Ghana, the majority of the Shanglin miners started mining in the rural
areas surrounding Kumasi, Obuasi and Takoradi, compensating land owners – including traditional
chiefs – with usage fees. Clearly, the Chinese did not act alone in locating gold or gaining access
to land in Ghana. Indeed, a participant in a focus group discussion in one mining community indi-
cated this when commenting on Chinese involvement in the illegal mining activities:
the townsfolk themselves sell the land to them [Chinese miners]. They search for the gold and
when they ﬁnd some, then they look for the Chinese to buy. . .The locals themselves register every-
thing in their names and give it to the Chinese at a percentage.9
Additionally, mining was facilitated by local government ofﬁcials and other government agencies
demanding payments to “turn a blind eye” to Chinese mining activities or, in the case of
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immigration ofﬁcials, for the provision of (false) work permits (Song, 2013; Crawford and Botch-
wey, 2017).10
Mining activities have generally been ﬁnanced by individuals or small groups of Chinese nation-
als. Investors then employ workers from China who are promised a ﬁxed monthly wage, plus a
small percentage of the gold income, as well as local Ghanaians who are paid at a much lower
daily rate than the Chinese workers. At the height of the gold rush, huge sums of money were
being sent from Ghana to China from sales of gold – with estimates indicating that the amount out-
stripped the Ghanaian governmental revenue (He, 2013; Song, 2013). However, despite the huge
amounts of money involved, the Chinese miners have certainly not uniformly beneﬁted from the
gold rush. Many of the early arrivals were able to ﬁnd gold and quickly scale up, whereas many
late arrivals did not have sufﬁcient capital to start their own mining operations and instead worked
as paid labourers. In the words of the elderly parents of a miner who has been a contracted worker
in Ghana for the past three years:
We have no capital at all so he could not invest in a machine even if he cooperated with others. . .
It’s difﬁcult to get the loan because we are too poor and there is nothing to mortgage. . . He has
been employed since he went to Ghana, however, because his boss has been unsuccessful, my son
does not earn enough to send money home so we cannot ﬁx the house [there was a large crack in
the wall].11
Some miners were also caught up in the government crackdowns before being able to accumulate
enough money to send home to cover debts related to travel expenses and the purchase of mining
machinery, putting them and their families in precarious situations.12
Before the arrival of the Chinese miners, many artisanal gold miners in Ghana continued to rely
on very rudimentary methods – pick, shovel and bowl – while others had shown “ingenuity and
creativity” in adapting and developing small-scale machinery at existing mine sites, for example
the “ingeniously fabricated contraptions” that combined diamond and gold processing technologies,
as observed by Nyame and Grant (2012: 170). Although Ghanaian artisanal miners had displayed
the ability to improvise and innovate in such ways, the Shanglin miners introduced technology and
mining machinery that was altogether more sophisticated and on a larger-scale (Crawford et al.,
2015: 12). This equipment had largely been developed in Shanglin County, and there are currently
three companies producing the mining machinery locally for sale worldwide, with the primary cus-
tomer base being Shanglin miners in other countries.13 The machines are a substantial investment,
usually costing approximately one million yuan (US$150,000) and an additional 20,000 yuan (US
$3,000) for shipment to Ghana. Miners who are able to invest in machines have the potential to
strike it rich, as they set up their own operations. However, if they purchase a machine and are
unsuccessful – or if their machine is expropriated/destroyed in a crackdown – they will often ﬁnd
themselves in considerable debt.
Chinese miners also brought large amounts of capital to pay for living expenses, rent and bribes
to ofﬁcials and local elites. Most of this money is pooled by investor groups consisting of close
family and friends. It comprises both savings and money borrowed from ﬁnancial institutions and/
or loan sharks in Shanglin County, which puts considerable pressure on the miners to successfully
ﬁnd gold.14
Across much of China rural credit cooperatives provide individual loans of around US $25,000
without need for collateral. Thus, a group of eight Chinese miners, the number required to under-
take a mechanised operation, can usually pull together US $200,000 to invest in mining equipment
and other expenses (Crawford et al., 2015: 13). This combination of new technology, capital, and
pressure to access gold resulted in a huge intensiﬁcation of production – both in collaboration with
Ghanaian licensed, small-scale concession-holders, and on unlicensed land obtained from chiefs
and other landowners.
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While collaboration between Chinese and Ghanaian miners resulted in mutual beneﬁts and
boosted local economies (as discussed below), the involvement of the Shanglin miners was also
controversial for several reasons. First, and most fundamentally, alluvial mining undertaken by
Chinese miners in Ghana is illegal. As noted above, small-scale mining is restricted to Ghanaian
citizens by law. Thus, all foreign miners as well as unregistered Ghanaian artisanal miners – the
so-called galamsey – have been operating illicitly. Second, the scale of environmental degradation
of both land and waterbodies intensiﬁed due to the mining practices, as discussed below. Third,
while sales of gold from small-scale mining to the Precious Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC)
– the ofﬁcial government gold buying and exporting agency – increased substantially at this time,
there have been accusations of gold being smuggled out of the country by Chinese miners (Craw-
ford and Botchwey, 2017: 455). However, interviews with returned miners in Shanglin have not
directly supported this allegation. Rather, miners state that they sold gold to informal middlemen in
Ghana, many of whom are also Chinese citizens – mainly from Zhejiang and Fujian Provinces –
who then provided cash and/or transferred funds directly to bank accounts in China.15
However, it is not known how these middlemen then sold on the gold, whether legitimately or
otherwise. Fourth, while this phenomenon of migrant Chinese miners was mostly characterized by
collaboration with locals, there were also instances of conﬂict resulting in injuries and even death.
Chinese miners were sometimes the victims of robberies, and responded by arming themselves with
ﬁrearms, such as shotguns (Hirsch, 2013). Returned miners in Shanglin acknowledged that all min-
ing groups had multiple guns – often up to ﬁve guns per group of ten miners – which were used
primarily as deterrence and for hunting. Rather shockingly, they also stated that these weapons
were often purchased directly from the police, and for an extra fee even come with an “ofﬁcial”
registration certiﬁcate, giving the transaction the illusion of legality.16
Initially the Ghanaian government was slow to act in the face of various aspects of illegality
associated with an intensiﬁcation of small-scale mining from 2010 onwards. However, increasingly
adverse coverage by the Ghanaian media, with a particular focus on local conﬂicts and environ-
mental destruction, ultimately pushed the Government of Ghana into action (Abid et al., 2013). In
May 2013, former President Mahama established an Inter-Ministerial task force aimed at combat-
ting illegal small-scale mining. The President was careful to include all illegal mining activities in
the task force’s remit; however, the subtext was clear – this was a measure aimed at foreign min-
ers, especially Chinese nationals. As indicated above, the task force entailed a military-style opera-
tion and resulted in the deportation or “voluntary” departure of 4,592 Chinese nationals, as well as
smaller numbers of citizens from Niger, Togo and Russia (Modern Ghana, 12 July 2013; He,
2013)
The number of Chinese miners in Ghana has reduced since this ﬁrst crackdown, but Chinese
involvement in small-scale mining has not ceased. Instead, it has become more concealed. An inter-
view with a community leader revealed that the task force did not pursue all foreign miners. He
commented as follows: “None of the government’s task force ever came here. They went to other
places and arrested some Chinese, but not in this area. Some of the Chinese are still mining in this
area”.17
Some miners have moved into more remote areas where they are less likely to be discovered
(Quartey, 2013), while others put their machines in storage, waiting for the political climate to cool
before returning to mining in collaboration with their Ghanaian partners.18
Some other Chinese nationals made the transition from direct mining to involvement in mining-
related businesses, for instance the hire of machinery or hidden ownership in small-scale conces-
sions fronted by Ghanaians. At the time of writing, in June 2018, the issue of illicit Chinese
involvement in small-scale mining has remained in the media following the government’s morato-
rium from early April 2017 on all ASM operations (Jamasmie, 2017). Although only 12 Chinese
nationals have reportedly been arrested for illegal mining out of approximately 1000 in total under
Operation Vanguard, the arrest of Asia (known as Aisha) Huang, the so-called “Galamsey Queen”,
316 Botchwey, Crawford, Loubere and Lu
© 2018 UNU-WIDER
and four compatriots, has attracted media headlines concerning her alleged role in facilitating illegal
mining by Chinese miners and her alleged contacts with high-proﬁle politicians.19
Strained diplomatic exchanges have also occurred between the Ghanaian Minister of Information,
Mustapha Hamid and the Chinese Ambassador to Ghana.20
As with the crackdown in 2013, Chinese miners in Ghana are currently maintaining a low proﬁle
and waiting for the political winds to change direction again.21 It is clear, therefore, that although
the intense period of China-Ghana irregular migration associated with small-scale mining has
reduced, it remains ongoing and continues to have signiﬁcant impact on the lives of people in both
Ghana and China.
Impacts of the Chinese gold rush on livelihoods and landscapes
The implications of the relatively short but intense episode of irregular migration from 2008 to
2013 are numerous and wide-ranging. In this section, we examine the impact that this gold rush
has had on the practice of ASM in Ghana; on the physical landscape through environmental degra-
dation; on the economy at both macro level and micro level for Chinese and Ghanaian miners and
their families; and ﬁnally, on governance in Ghana, including the impact on the legitimacy and
authority of the state.
Environmental degradation
Environmental degradation has long been associated with small-scale alluvial mining. This is partic-
ularly the case with galamsey activities, given their illicit nature which makes it difﬁcult to afﬁx
accountability for damage caused (Armah et al., 2013; Tschakert, 2016). There have been particular
concerns arising around the destruction of farmlands, the diversion of streams and rivers for mining
purposes, as well as surface and ground water pollution through the usage of hazardous chemicals
–particularly cyanide and mercury for processing gold (CSIR–Water Research Institute 2013),
although more nuanced views have been offered by some academic researchers (for instance, Hil-
son et al., 2007; Tschakert and Singha, 2007; Nyame and Grant, 2014: 82).22 Mechanization has
intensiﬁed the degradation of both land and water in areas of alluvial mining. Farmland in particu-
lar has been extensively destroyed during the scramble to acquire land for small-scale mining from
2008 onwards, affecting both food crop production and cash crops (such as cocoa), and resulting in
adverse effects for both food security and foreign currency earnings (Crawford and Botchwey,
2017: 12). One woman stated in a focus group discussion that:
Most of us are farmers and our farms are across the river, but the mining activities have expanded
the river making it impossible for us to cross to our farms.23
On registered concessions, local licensed miners have the responsibility for land reclamation and
clean up, yet respondents in both Ghana and China suggested that license holders would take
money from Chinese partners for reclamation purposes, but did not follow through on their legal
obligations after mining was complete.24 While the destruction of farmland has undoubtedly caused
serious problems, the destruction of river systems has emerged as a new and potentially catas-
trophic form of environmental degradation. Ghana’s waterbodies have been ravaged by “dredging
mining” in rivers by means of equipment and techniques introduced by Chinese miners, despite the
fact that river mining is illegal. Post-task force, Ghanaian miners have continued this practice using
Chinese machinery to dredge the riverbed and process the excavated material for gold, often with
mercury. In interviews, Chinese miners suggested that little mercury is actually used and that the
disruption to water resources can be remedied after mining is complete – thus claiming that their
practices are less polluting than large mining companies.25
South-South irregular migration 317
© 2018 UNU-WIDER
However, these individual perspectives probably fail to consider the combined impact of tens of
thousands of miners across the country. Indeed, plenty evidence is available to demonstrate that the
gold rush has resulted in severe river pollution –notably the Pra river and its tributaries such as the
Ofﬁn, which have high levels of water turbidity, causing harm to aquatic ecosystems and loss of
aquatic life and contaminated drinking water (CSIR - Water Research Institute 2013). Treatment to
make water drinkable again becomes more difﬁcult and costly. In 2013, Daniel Mishio – the chair-
man of Ghana’s national security commission for lands and natural resources – was quoted as say-
ing that “In certain areas, people don’t even get clean drinking water, and in some areas you can
see that most of the forest cover has been destroyed. This poses a very big danger to our future”
(Hirsch, 2013). In the years following the ﬁrst crackdown, illegal mining has continued to intensify
the pollution of Ghanaian rivers, and in March 2017 the Ghana Water Company warned that the
country would soon have to begin importing water for consumption if illegal mining activities were
not curbed (cited in Abdulai, 2017, 1). This was a key reason for the Government’s moratorium on
all small-scale mining from April 2017.
Livelihood Impact: Small-scale mining becomes big business
One consequence of the mechanization and intensiﬁcation of small-scale gold production is that the
economic rewards are now much greater for those involved – i.e. licensed Ghanaian miners, Chi-
nese miners, and galamsey operators – and livelihoods for many have been considerably enhanced.
One common type of mining operation that continued after the initial crackdown involves licensed
miners sub-leasing their concession of land to Chinese miners and splitting the value of the gold
production – usually 15 per cent to the concession holder(s) and 85 per cent to the Chinese miners
who effectively do all the mining.26
Licensed miners reported that a 15-per cent stake can often amount to an income of 15,000–
25,000 Ghana cedis per week (approximately US$4,000–US$6,500).27 These ﬁndings indicate that
the Chinese miners and their local partners have managed to ﬁnd a grey zone allowing them to cir-
cumvent the law restricting small-scale mining to Ghanaian citizens, although such “sub-letting”
remains illegal.
Despite their illicit nature, it is evident that some Chinese mining operations have been extremely
proﬁtable. In a 2014 interview, one Chinese national in Ghana, with Chinese miners as business
clients, stated that “in four to 5 years, a lot of Chinese millionaires, even billionaires” were created,
adding that they “had worked very hard”.28 Chinese media reports have highlighted the large sums
that Chinese miners made in Ghana. For instance, the twenty-ﬁrst Century Business Herald – a
Chinese business daily – reported on the riches made by some miners from Shanglin, quoting earn-
ings of US$500 million, and referencing stories of gold bars sent to China as gifts and the purchas-
ing of Ferraris (Ghanaweb, 17 May 2013).29
While interviews with returned miners in Shanglin did not conﬁrm the claims of gold being
smuggled out of Ghana, some miners certainly earned substantial sums, which were then trans-
ferred to accounts in Shanglin County. Indeed, the previously cited report referenced one local
bank source as stating that in May and June 2011 alone, more than one billion yuan (approximately
US$150 million) was wired into Shanglin from abroad.30
In our interviews, ofﬁcials in Shanglin also estimated that in the peak years over 10 billion yuan
(approximately US$1.5 billion) ﬂowed through the county’s ﬁnancial institutions each year.31 The
interviews with returned miners also suggested that in the best of times 100,000 yuan could be
made in gross proﬁt daily (approximately US$15,000), per small-scale mining operation of about
eight Chinese miners.32 Although the media stories of lavish spending by Chinese miners are often
exaggerated, there is no doubt that substantial sums of money were involved in this migration epi-
sode, and that fortunes were quickly made by some Shanglin miners.
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Yet lucrative and illicit business also involved substantial risks for the Chinese miners in their
Ghanaian operations. The crackdowns and recent moratorium are extreme examples of the struc-
tural risks facing the miners, but there are also everyday risks involved in the extraction of gold in
Ghana. The Chinese miners were very security conscious, and all returned miners that we spoke
with reported that they purchased multiple weapons to protect themselves against potential night-
time robberies at their mining sites. Additionally, selling the gold was a particularly dangerous
activity. In the words of one returned miner: “We sell the gold to an Indian or Chinese middleman
who transfers money directly to our account in China. However, the local thieves know when and
where we are going to sell the gold so we have to be very cautious not to get robbed on the
way”.33 In addition to being risky, the initial investment is capital-intensive often requiring loans
and/or the pooling of money for investment through family and friend networks.
However, small-scale mining was not a lucrative business for everyone. While a relatively small
number of Chinese and Ghanaian miners have earned huge sums, not everyone has been success-
ful, and many have even lost out from the gold rush. For instance, inequalities amongst Ghanaians
involved in small-scale mining have increased substantially. This includes a gendered dimension,
as women, children, and many young people are left to extract the “scraps” left after mechanized
alluvial gold mining. This involves rewashing gravel in heaps of “tailings” at pits that have been
abandoned after intensive mining with the Chinese machinery.34 The beneﬁts have also not accrued
equally amongst the Chinese. From interviews with returned miners, it appears that those who
arrived early (before 2008) were often able to invest in their own equipment and ﬁnd productive
concessions. These miners were thus able to quickly enrich themselves. This group often trans-
ferred funds back to China for investment in large urban areas rather than in Shanglin itself – e.g.
the buying of property in Nanning, Shanghai, Beijing, and other burgeoning real estate markets.
They also invested in scaling-up their mining activities in Ghana and other countries in West
Africa, such as Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and the DRC. However, the Chinese miners who went
later as wage labourers, rather than investors, were not able to earn such large sums of money.
Often these miners attempted to save up for investment in their own machinery as soon as possible.
Unfortunately for many of them, they were only able to invest just before the 2013 crackdown.
This left many Chinese miners with large debts and no ability to repay without continuing to
mine.35 Indeed, ﬁrst-hand accounts conﬁrm reports of less fortunate Chinese miners, especially
those who had arrived shortly before the crackdown in mid-2013, who had not gained sufﬁcient
income from gold to repay loans or to afford a ﬂight home, and hence ﬂed into remoter parts of
“the bush” to continue mining in what had become a hostile context (Quartey, 2013).
Wider Economic impact
Since the beginning of the gold rush, the contribution of gold production from the small-scale sec-
tor to the Ghanaian economy has increased substantially – a direct result of the mechanized produc-
tion introduced by Chinese miners. Ofﬁcial ﬁgures (see Table 1) reveal that the small-scale sector
has grown rapidly in the last decade, especially from 2010 onwards. The volume of gold from
small-scale mining increased seven-fold from 225,411 ounces in 2005 to 1,576,478 ounces in
2013, and, despite dips, this was maintained in 2016 at 1,570,029 ounces.36 Additionally, the per-
centage of total gold production from small-scale mining (in comparison with large-scale mining)
has increased from 7.4 per cent in 1995 to 15.2 per cent in 2008, and then to a remarkable 36 per
cent in 2013 and 38 per cent in 2016. The most recent ﬁgures for 2016 show total annual gold pro-
duction of 4.13 million ounces, of which 2.56 million ounces is from large-scale production and
1.57 ounces from small-scale production. This indicates how the small-scale sector, despite its lar-
gely illicit nature and the adverse economic impact of the current moratorium, has developed into a
highly signiﬁcant economic sector within Ghana,
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During the gold rush, local business people did well from the soaring demands for fuel, food and
rental accommodation. According to one ASM association member, “local businesses were boom-
ing, especially sales of fruits, vegetables and general food items; locals employed to operate mining
machines [by Chinese miners] were paid better wages than those working for local small-scale
miners”.37
In his words, “the town was hot, very busy” and local people “had money in their pockets”.38
Research has revealed that local traders were upset when the task force chased away the Chinese
miners, resulting in a decline in sales.39
This conﬁrmed the study by Liu (2014), who undertook interviews in Dunkwa at the time of the
ﬁrst crackdown in June 2013. Local respondents reported loss of employment – for instance as
cooks or laundry women at mining sites – and signiﬁcant declines in business income. Some local
traders even stated: “we want them [the Chinese miners] to come back” (Liu, 2014: 14).40 The Chi-
nese miners have also seen themselves as facilitating the economic transformation of “backward”
areas of Ghana, saying things like: “before there was nothing” and that the Chinese presence has
“changed and improved the situation of the local people a lot. . . they wanted us there because they
can earn money too”.41
However, economic booms are also characterized by the emergence of losers. Local people who
were not able to beneﬁt from the mining have suffered from the rising cost of living, notably food
prices and rents, driven up by the high demand. At the height of the boom, basic goods such as
vegetables and meat, became scarce or unavailable, reportedly bought up en masse by Chinese
miners and taken to their encampments.42
In addition, shortages of diesel became a common phenomenon in Dunkwa due to the high
demand for fuel to run the excavators.43
Further negative effects were due to the switch in land use from farming to mining, with a detri-
mental impact on agricultural production. This also contributed to rising food prices and reduced
availability of locally produced food, with people from outlying villages now more dependent on
buying food from markets in Dunkwa (necessitating wage incomes) and less reliant on subsistence
production.44
The loss of farmland is a signiﬁcant long-term negative effect, as good agricultural land has been
destroyed and is no longer ﬁt for cultivation after being sold by local land owners to Chinese min-
ers for short-term ﬁnancial gain.45
TABLE 1





Producers (oz) Total Ghana Production (oz)
ASM contribution to
total gold production (%)
2005 1,913,534 225,411 2,138,945 11
2006 2,090,721 247,063 2,337,784 11
2007 2,239,696 388,594 2,628,290 15
2008 2,378,012 418,943 2,796,955 15
2009 2,564,095 555,737 3,119,832 18
2010 2,624,391 767,196 3,391,587 23
2011 2,697,661 978,611 3,676,272 27
2012 2,856,243 1,481,670 4,337,913 34
2013 2,820,419 1,576,478 4,396,897 36
2014 2,685,399 1,484,793 4,170,192 36
2015 2,848,574 1,070,648 3,919,222 27
2016 2,561,441 1,570,029 4,131,440 38
Source: Minerals Commission Ghana 2014; Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2015, 2016a,b.
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Political impact
Where was the state in this context and what does this episode tell us about the Ghanaian state
more generally? This is a particularly pertinent question, given the degree of illegality involved.
Initially, the government appeared slow to respond to the sudden scramble for the country’s min-
eral resources by foreign and local miners alike. However, by 2012 and 2013 the gold rush started
to become a political issue, with the situation being described as “out of control” and characterized
by “a culture of impunity” by a senior environmental ofﬁcial.46 The state’s inaction became the tar-
get of an increasingly critical media, with stories about local conﬂicts and environmental destruc-
tion becoming headlines in major news outlets. This despair over lack of government action is
typiﬁed in an early 2013 article in the Daily Graphic, the country’s most established newspaper.
Under the headline of “Deal with illegal miners now”, the author states: “As we look on in helpless
amazement, foreigners continue to degrade our lands and pollute our waterbodies” (Frimpong,
2013).
However, despite this perception of a state conspicuous by its absence, our research reveals that
the Ghanaian state was both active and present – but not effective from a regulatory perspective.
Undoubtedly, a number of authorities failed in their responsibilities: immigration ofﬁcials, the Min-
erals Commission, regional and local governments and the police. Yet Ghana is not a failed state
or even a weak state, as is evidenced by the subsequent military-style operation undertaken by the
Inter-Ministerial task force in mid-2013 and again with the moratorium and Operation Vanguard in
2017 and 2018. So why did such pervasive institutional failure occur at different levels of govern-
ment? It would seem that endemic corruption is the main explanatory factor, with politicians and
government ofﬁcials at different levels colluding with illegal mining activities. This happened
explicitly, with ofﬁcials taking bribes to “look the other way”, and thus sharing in the beneﬁts of
unlawful practices. And it occurred more subtly, with ofﬁcials unlawfully providing (false) permits
(for a price) that placed Chinese miners in legal grey zones – e.g. immigration ofﬁcials would issue
Chinese miners with work permits that were clearly not valid under national law. In interviews,
miners said that this created a confusing and precarious situation, as they felt recognized by some
parts of the state but not others. To make the situation more complicated, the Chinese miners felt
that they often had good working relationships with local elites and the police. One interviewee
even told us that the Chinese miners in one area would simply visit the local police station each
month to turn themselves in for breaking the law, and then pay the ﬁne for their transgression.47
Allegations of corruption amongst Ghanaian state ofﬁcials and traditional authorities was a recur-
ring theme in interviews in Ghana. For instance, one Chinese resident in Ghana with ﬁrst-hand
experience of the Shanglin miners stated that with the task force the Chinese miners were “no
longer protected by the [Ghanaian] government”.48 In other words, foreign miners have been pro-
tected – at least by some governmental actors – and were thus able to carry out unlawful and prof-
itable activities, as long as they continued to make ﬁnancial contributions to corrupt ofﬁcials and
politicians. This interviewee further alleged that “money talks”, and that Chinese miners had made
payments to ofﬁcials at both upper and lower levels of government, with the latter also expected to
channel money to their superiors. He alleged that “many people were involved”, including high-
ranking politicians and ofﬁcials from key government agencies.49
CONCLUSION
This article has looked at a remarkable phenomenon, the South-South irregular migration from
China to Ghana of tens of thousands of miners to work illicitly in informal small-scale gold min-
ing, most notably during the boom years of exceptionally high gold prices from 2010 to 2013.
South-South irregular migration 321
© 2018 UNU-WIDER
While much South-South migration is from poorer to relatively wealthier countries, for instance
Ethiopia to South Africa or Nepal to Malaysia, this was an example of migration from upper-mid-
dle income China to lower middle-income Ghana – driven by access to valuable mineral resources.
It is notable, however, that this migration ﬂow, as an irregular one, involved predominantly work-
ing-class miners from an ethnic minority group in a relatively poor region of China moving to
another socio-economically deprived area in rural Ghana. It is, therefore, a case of marginal people
travelling from one periphery to another in search of resources to make a livelihood, and hopefully
to strike it rich. As noted above, research ﬁndings conﬁrm that this has been a spontaneous move-
ment of people with no direct linkage to, or encouragement from, the Chinese state. Despite a com-
mon focus on access to mineral resources, this is a very different kind of Chinese engagement in
Africa from Chinese state-related projects often associated with “infrastructure-for-resources loans”.
Such irregular migration into an informal sector has received very limited scholarly attention.
This article has explored the question of what impact mass migration of this kind has on the liveli-
hoods of both Chinese and Ghanaian informal miners, as well as on wider economic, environmen-
tal, and political landscapes in Ghana. We conclude that the impact has been signiﬁcant in a
number of dimensions.
The economic impact has been momentous. From a traditional industry largely using the same
rudimentary methods for centuries, small-scale gold mining in Ghana has changed irrevocably, and
Ghanaian miners now use the machinery and techniques introduced by the Shanglin miners. Indeed,
such mechanized mining can no longer be described as “artisanal”. Despite small-scale mining
being long neglected by the government in favour of large-scale production by transnational mining
corporations (Hilson et al., 2014), the mechanization of production has meant that the proportion of
gold produced from small-scale mining has now soared to one-third of the country’s total output.
Economic opportunities for those directly involved can be substantial. Those Ghanaians at the apex
of small-scale gold mining now earn large sums of money from mechanized mining, and, for these
local actors at least, small-scale mining has moved beyond a poverty-related activity. It is also evi-
dent, however, that inequalities have widened, with increased stratiﬁcation within the small-scale
mining industry in Ghana, where women and children at the bottom of the hierarchy have to eke
out a living from the heaps of “tailings” that remain after intensive mining has been completed.
Further research could investigate the differential impact of mechanized small-scale mining on rural
dwellers in Ghana.
Equally, it is clear that while some Shanglin miners, themselves from a relatively poor minority
ethnic group, have amassed considerable fortunes in a short time, there are also signiﬁcant inequali-
ties within the Chinese mining groups, dependent on positions as owner or labourer. While the
mining groups are often described as collaborative efforts (He, 2013), hierarchical structures can be
observed (Song, 2013). This also indicates that individual Chinese miners have beneﬁted in Ghana
in signiﬁcantly different ways – with some even being exploited. For instance, in some cases when
gold is not discovered, the Chinese employers (i.e. owners of the equipment) have refused to pay
the salaries of the Chinese employees.50
These ﬁndings mirror research on small-scale mining within China – for instance Lu and Lora-
Wainwright’s (2014) study in Hunan Province – which found that livelihood beneﬁts are highly
differentiated, with wealthier investors who began mining earlier proﬁting at a much higher rate
than more marginalized individuals entering at later times. Future research could focus on the
cleavages and power differentials that exist within and across groups of Chinese miners, and exam-
ine the differentiated impact that the Ghanaian gold rush has had on their livelihoods and the wel-
fare of their households back in China.
Environmental degradation is a serious consequence of unregulated mining. The anti-galamsey
narrative of government and the media about illegal mining in Ghana has always included criticism
of adverse environmental consequences, notably mercury seepage into rivers and streams. However,
the scale of these consequences is now much greater, with mechanized and intensiﬁed production
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resulting in much larger areas of land degradation and the severe pollution of water-bodies. It is
undoubtedly the case that Chinese miners introduced mechanized production, including the equip-
ment to mine (illegally) in rivers, and such techniques have subsequently been adopted by Ghana-
ian miners. The absence of government action in the face of such illegal mining in rivers, both
prior to and post-2013 task force (Crawford and Botchwey, 2017), has led to the current crisis
where the severe pollution of arterial rivers is now perceived by the Ghana Water Company as
threatening future household water supplies. These environmental impacts require further in-depth
study to understand how the changes in the physical landscape from intensiﬁed mining have
impacted on local people’s lives and livelihoods, as well as the necessary regulation to stem and
reverse environmental destruction.
The political impact is also highly signiﬁcant and consequential. While it appeared that the state
was largely absent during this dramatic period of mass irregular migration into informal and illicit
small-scale gold mining, our ﬁndings are that both the state and traditional authorities were present
and active during this episode – but mainly in a corrupt and self-enriching manner. The abuse by
many state ofﬁcials, politicians and traditional chiefs of their positions of power and authority, for
purposes of private wealth accumulation, is the key factor that explains why illegal mining by Chi-
nese and other foreign miners, along with their Ghanaian counterparts, continued unchallenged for
so long. The image of Ghana as a shining example of democracy in Africa is severely tarnished by
such ﬁndings, and poses further research questions about the nature of the state in Ghana and in
whose interests, it operates, whichever of the two main political parties is in power.
Unregulated mining, as exempliﬁed by the recent “free-for-all” for Ghana’s gold resources by
both Ghanaian citizens and foreign nationals, cannot continue without severe adverse consequences,
most notably environmental ones. The policy implications, with particular reference to livelihoods
and landscapes, require reforms in both mining and migration policies. First, in terms of mining
policy, artisanal and small-scale mining has undergone changes in terms of technology and scale
that are irreversible. This has occurred mostly through foreign involvement, and there are indica-
tions that this still continues, albeit less obviously than before. Foreign nationals, mainly from
China, continue to be involved in the sector through ﬁnancing, equipment supply and maintenance,
direct mining and trading of gold. The Ghanaian government has to recognize this through legisla-
tion, for instance by reclassifying the mining industry to include a medium-scale mining sector in
terms of technology and scale of production, with an appropriate legal framework that includes
joint ventures with foreign miners. Importantly, an effective system to address environmental prob-
lems is required, with responsibilities clearly delineated. This system could include, for instance,
upfront fees and monitoring of compulsory reclamation of mining sites. Second, Ghana’s migration
policy has to come to grips with the reality of South-South irregular migration and put in place a
mechanism to manage this. Perhaps, the state could consider the issuance of customized work per-
mits, with eligible lines of employment. The current policy of ad hoc crackdowns undertaken by
governments of both main parties is unlikely to succeed, and does not reﬂect a progressive path to
address high unemployment, especially of youth in rural areas, and low productivity in ASM.
This article has focused on analysing the signiﬁcant impacts of irregular migration from China
into the informal small-scale mining sector in Ghana. Building on this, further research in both
Ghana and Shanglin County in China could provide a critical examination of South-South labour
migration and the complex web of relationships that connect peripheral rural China with the mar-
gins of Ghana. Such research is aimed at shedding light on “the processes implicit within global
capitalism that prompt large numbers of precarious and marginal people to move from one place to
another – and sometimes back again – in search of more secure livelihoods” (Loubere and Craw-
ford, 2017: 121), as well as the accompanying patterns of resource extraction, capital accumulation,
exploitation and inequality within and between the people involved in both places.
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NOTES
1. In early April 2017, the government under President Akufo-Addo announced a moratorium on all small-
scale mining, including the cessation of the issuance of new mining licences, partly in response to the cri-
sis in the sector that has emerged from the changes introduced by the mass migration phenomenon dis-
cussed here
2. It is estimated that 85 per cent of ASM operations remain informal and illicit (Ofosu-Mensah, 2016)
3. (http://www.pulse.com.gh/news/illegal-mining-ghana-places-moratorium-on-small-scale-mining-licenses-id
6482890.html.) A moratorium on all ASM was declared in early April 2017, initially for six months, then
for a further three months, and extended indeﬁnitely in early March 2018 (Daily Graphic, March 8 2018)
4. (http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/features/3966-operation-vanguard-a-timely-saviour-of-
our-environment.) The head of the task force, Colonel Amoah Ayisi, stated on 30 January 2018 that Oper-
ation Vanguard had arrested 983 miners, including 12 Chinese and four Burkinabe miners, and seized
large amounts of mining equipment and weapons, including 366 excavators, 3,100 dredgers known as
Champhi and 859 water pumping machines. (https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2018/January-30th/only-
10-of-galamsey-suspects-convicted-operation-vanguard-laments-slow-prosecution.php.)
5. In September 2010, the government of Ghana signed an agreement for a 13 billion USD loan with the
Chinese Development Bank and Chinese Exim Bank for infrastructure development, especially in the (then
new) oil and gas sector, with sixty percent of contracts going to Chinese companies and repayments guar-
anteed by supplies of crude oil (http://china.aiddata.org/projects/2034).
6. Personal correspondence.
7. Interviews with returned miners and ofﬁcials, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 15 and 18 August 2017
8. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16 August 2017.
9. Buabenso Focus Group Discussion, 29 July 2014.
10. Interviews with a Chinese journalist and a Chinese businessman who are primarily based in Ghana, Nan-
ning City, 22 August 2017.
11. Interview with parents of a non-returned miner, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16 June 2018.
12. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 15 August 2017.
13. Interviews with mining machinery company and returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 15-16
August 2017.
14. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 15-16 August 2017.
15. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16-21 August 2017.
16. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16-21 August 2017.
17. Interview with community leader, Pokukrom, 27 July 2014.
18. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16-21 August 2017.
19. See, for example, https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/May-8th/arrest-of-powerful-chinese-galamsey-
woman-blow-by-blow-account.php; https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Galamsey-
queen-broke-Lawyer-604674 28 November 2017; https://yen.com.gh/93195-photos-the-high-life-galamsey-
queen-asia-huang.html#93195.
20. Andoh, 2017. Media reports have also included the arrest and detention of a Chinese woman allegedly
involved prominently in the small-scale mining industry, inclusive of allegations of sexual blackmail
against high-ranking Ghanaian politicians and ofﬁcials. (GhanaWeb 10 May 2017).
21. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16-21 August 2017.
22. Scholars have suggested government-led dialogue and training for galamsey miners to improve awareness
concnering mercury use (Hilson et al., 2007), in contrast to ostracization through the negative dominant
discourse that portrays miners as lawless and criminal with no concern for environmental harm (Tschakert
and Singha, 2007; Nyame and Grant, 2014).
23. Buabenso Focus Group Discussion, 29 July 2014.
24. Interview with Assembly member for Pokukrom, Upper Denkyira East Municipal Assembly, 27 July
2014.
25. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16-21 August 2017.
26. Interviews with small-scale concession holders, Upper Denkyira East Municipality, Ghana, 26 July 2014
and 29 July 2014.
27. Interviews with small-scale concession holders, Upper Denkyira East Municipality, Ghana, 26 July 2014
and 29 July 2014.
28. Interview with Chinese national, resident in Ghana, Accra, 12 January 2015.




31. Interviews with local ofﬁcials, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 15 August 2017.
32. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16-21 August 2017.
33. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 14 June 2018.
34. Women’s focus group discussion, Buabenso, Upper Denkyira East Municipality, 29 July 2014.
35. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16-21 August 2017.
36. The dip in small-scale production in 2015 seems to be explained by two factors. First, the government
clamped down heavily on illegal exports of gold and so many miners/buyers held on to what they had.
However, this gold was later sold through the PMMC, leading to a 486% increase in the gold exports of
PMMC in 2016 (from 267,662 ounces in 2015 to 1,570,029 ounces in 2016). Second, there was a global
fall in demand for gold in 2015, leading to declining prices on the local market which in turn adversely
affected production (Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2015, 2016a,b).
37. Interview with journalist, 23 July 2014; with former small-scale miner, 23 July 2014; with ASM associa-
tion member, 26 July 2014, all Upper Denkyira East Municipality.
38. Interview with licensed small-scale miner and member of the ASM association, Upper Denkyira East
Municipality, 26 July 2014.
39. Interviews with local radio journalist, 23 July 2014; with former small-scale miner, 23 July 2014; with
ASM association member, 26 July 2014, all Upper Denkyira East Municipality.
40. Liu (2014: 14) reports a worker at a ﬁlling (gas) station in Dunkwa as stating that sales were “30-40 thou-
sand litres per day when the Chinese were here; but now after the clamp down, the business dropped shar-
ply to only 1 thousand litres per day”. Additionally, one female market trader is reported as stating
emotionally: “You Chinese people come back to Ghana! Chinese people come back to Ghana! Chinese is
job and money! After Chinese were gone, my life is getting tougher. In the past I could earn 200 cedis
working for Chinese, but now I have nothing. If you Chinese do not come back, we are going to march to
the government to ask for your coming back” (2013: 15).
41. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 18 and 19 August 2017.
42. Interview with Municipal Assembly ofﬁcial, Upper Denkyira East Municipality 28 July 2014.
43. Interviews with the families of non-miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 17 August 2017.
44. Interview with municipal education director, Upper Denkyira East Municipality 25 July 2014.
45. Interview with small business operator, Wasa Akropong, Western region, 2 April 2014.
46. Interview with senior ofﬁcial at Environmental Protection Agency, Accra, 9 April 2014.
47. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16-21 August 2017.
48. Interview with Chinese citizen resident in Ghana, Accra, 12 January 2015.
49. Interview with Chinese citizen resident in Ghana, 12 January 2015. He stated that those ofﬁcials not bene-
ﬁting “became crazy as there was so much money involved”, which in his view was a key reason for the
eventual crackdown by President Mahama.
50. Interviews with returned miners, Shanglin County, Guangxi, 16 August 2017.
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